3x-ui/web/job/check_client_ip_job.go

595 lines
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package job
import (
"bufio"
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"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"log"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"regexp"
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"runtime"
"sort"
"time"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v2/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v2/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v2/logger"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v2/xray"
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)
// IPWithTimestamp tracks an IP address with its last seen timestamp
type IPWithTimestamp struct {
IP string `json:"ip"`
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
}
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// CheckClientIpJob monitors client IP addresses from access logs and manages IP blocking based on configured limits.
type CheckClientIpJob struct {
lastClear int64
disAllowedIps []string
}
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var job *CheckClientIpJob
const defaultXrayAPIPort = 62789
Fix IP Limit continuous ban loop from stale DB entries (#4077) After 60abeaa flipped the excess-IP selector to "oldest wins, newest loses" (to protect the original/current connections), the per-client IP table in `inbound_client_ips.ips` never evicted IPs that stopped connecting. Their stored timestamp stayed ancient, so on every subsequent run they counted as the "oldest protected" slot(s) and whichever IP was actually using the config now was classified as "new excess" and re-banned via fail2ban. This is exactly the #4077 scenario: two IPs connect once and get recorded, the ban lifts after the configured duration, the lone legitimate IP that reconnects gets banned again, and again, and again — a permanent 3xipl.log loop with no real abuser anywhere. Fix: when merging the persisted `old` list with the freshly observed `new` log lines, drop entries whose last-seen timestamp is older than `ipStaleAfterSeconds` (30 minutes). A client that's actually still active refreshes its timestamp any time xray emits a new `accepted` line for a fresh TCP, so the cutoff is far above even idle streaming sessions; a client that's genuinely gone falls out of the table in bounded time and frees its slot. Extracted the merge into `mergeClientIps` so it can be exercised by unit tests without spinning up the full DB-backed job. Tests cover: - stale old entry is dropped (the #4077 regression) - fresh old entries are still carried forward (access-log rotation is still backed by the persisted table) - newer timestamp wins when the same IP appears in both lists - a clock-skewed old `new` entry can't resurrect a stale IP - a zero cutoff never over-evicts Closes #4077
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// ipStaleAfterSeconds controls how long a client IP kept in the
// per-client tracking table (model.InboundClientIps.Ips) is considered
// still "active" before it's evicted during the next scan.
//
// Without this eviction, an IP that connected once and then went away
// keeps sitting in the table with its old timestamp. Because the
// excess-IP selector sorts ascending ("oldest wins, newest loses") to
// protect the original/current connections, that stale entry keeps
// occupying a slot and the IP that is *actually* currently using the
// config gets classified as "new excess" and banned by fail2ban on
// every single run — producing the continuous ban loop from #4077.
//
// 30 minutes is chosen so an actively-streaming client (where xray
// emits a fresh `accepted` log line whenever it opens a new TCP) will
// always refresh its timestamp well within the window, but a client
// that has really stopped using the config will drop out of the table
// in a bounded time and free its slot.
const ipStaleAfterSeconds = int64(30 * 60)
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// NewCheckClientIpJob creates a new client IP monitoring job instance.
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func NewCheckClientIpJob() *CheckClientIpJob {
job = new(CheckClientIpJob)
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return job
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) Run() {
if j.lastClear == 0 {
j.lastClear = time.Now().Unix()
}
shouldClearAccessLog := false
iplimitActive := j.hasLimitIp()
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f2bInstalled := j.checkFail2BanInstalled()
isAccessLogAvailable := j.checkAccessLogAvailable(iplimitActive)
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if isAccessLogAvailable {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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if iplimitActive {
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shouldClearAccessLog = j.processLogFile()
}
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} else {
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if iplimitActive {
if f2bInstalled {
shouldClearAccessLog = j.processLogFile()
} else {
if !f2bInstalled {
logger.Warning("[LimitIP] Fail2Ban is not installed, Please install Fail2Ban from the x-ui bash menu.")
}
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}
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}
}
}
if shouldClearAccessLog || (isAccessLogAvailable && time.Now().Unix()-j.lastClear > 3600) {
j.clearAccessLog()
}
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) clearAccessLog() {
logAccessP, err := os.OpenFile(xray.GetAccessPersistentLogPath(), os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0o644)
j.checkError(err)
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defer logAccessP.Close()
accessLogPath, err := xray.GetAccessLogPath()
j.checkError(err)
file, err := os.Open(accessLogPath)
j.checkError(err)
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defer file.Close()
_, err = io.Copy(logAccessP, file)
j.checkError(err)
err = os.Truncate(accessLogPath, 0)
j.checkError(err)
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j.lastClear = time.Now().Unix()
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}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) hasLimitIp() bool {
db := database.GetDB()
var inbounds []*model.Inbound
err := db.Model(model.Inbound{}).Find(&inbounds).Error
if err != nil {
return false
}
for _, inbound := range inbounds {
if inbound.Settings == "" {
continue
}
settings := map[string][]model.Client{}
json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &settings)
clients := settings["clients"]
for _, client := range clients {
limitIp := client.LimitIP
if limitIp > 0 {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) processLogFile() bool {
ipRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`from (?:tcp:|udp:)?\[?([0-9a-fA-F\.:]+)\]?:\d+ accepted`)
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emailRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`email: (.+)$`)
timestampRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`^(\d{4}/\d{2}/\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2})`)
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accessLogPath, _ := xray.GetAccessLogPath()
file, _ := os.Open(accessLogPath)
defer file.Close()
// Track IPs with their last seen timestamp
inboundClientIps := make(map[string]map[string]int64, 100)
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(file)
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
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ipMatches := ipRegex.FindStringSubmatch(line)
if len(ipMatches) < 2 {
continue
}
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ip := ipMatches[1]
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if ip == "127.0.0.1" || ip == "::1" {
continue
}
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emailMatches := emailRegex.FindStringSubmatch(line)
if len(emailMatches) < 2 {
continue
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}
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email := emailMatches[1]
// Extract timestamp from log line
var timestamp int64
timestampMatches := timestampRegex.FindStringSubmatch(line)
if len(timestampMatches) >= 2 {
t, err := time.Parse("2006/01/02 15:04:05", timestampMatches[1])
if err == nil {
timestamp = t.Unix()
} else {
timestamp = time.Now().Unix()
}
} else {
timestamp = time.Now().Unix()
}
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if _, exists := inboundClientIps[email]; !exists {
inboundClientIps[email] = make(map[string]int64)
}
// Update timestamp - keep the latest
if existingTime, ok := inboundClientIps[email][ip]; !ok || timestamp > existingTime {
inboundClientIps[email][ip] = timestamp
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}
}
shouldCleanLog := false
for email, ipTimestamps := range inboundClientIps {
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// Convert to IPWithTimestamp slice
ipsWithTime := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(ipTimestamps))
for ip, timestamp := range ipTimestamps {
ipsWithTime = append(ipsWithTime, IPWithTimestamp{IP: ip, Timestamp: timestamp})
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}
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clientIpsRecord, err := j.getInboundClientIps(email)
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if err != nil {
j.addInboundClientIps(email, ipsWithTime)
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continue
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}
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shouldCleanLog = j.updateInboundClientIps(clientIpsRecord, email, ipsWithTime) || shouldCleanLog
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}
return shouldCleanLog
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}
Fix IP Limit continuous ban loop from stale DB entries (#4077) After 60abeaa flipped the excess-IP selector to "oldest wins, newest loses" (to protect the original/current connections), the per-client IP table in `inbound_client_ips.ips` never evicted IPs that stopped connecting. Their stored timestamp stayed ancient, so on every subsequent run they counted as the "oldest protected" slot(s) and whichever IP was actually using the config now was classified as "new excess" and re-banned via fail2ban. This is exactly the #4077 scenario: two IPs connect once and get recorded, the ban lifts after the configured duration, the lone legitimate IP that reconnects gets banned again, and again, and again — a permanent 3xipl.log loop with no real abuser anywhere. Fix: when merging the persisted `old` list with the freshly observed `new` log lines, drop entries whose last-seen timestamp is older than `ipStaleAfterSeconds` (30 minutes). A client that's actually still active refreshes its timestamp any time xray emits a new `accepted` line for a fresh TCP, so the cutoff is far above even idle streaming sessions; a client that's genuinely gone falls out of the table in bounded time and frees its slot. Extracted the merge into `mergeClientIps` so it can be exercised by unit tests without spinning up the full DB-backed job. Tests cover: - stale old entry is dropped (the #4077 regression) - fresh old entries are still carried forward (access-log rotation is still backed by the persisted table) - newer timestamp wins when the same IP appears in both lists - a clock-skewed old `new` entry can't resurrect a stale IP - a zero cutoff never over-evicts Closes #4077
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// mergeClientIps combines the persisted (old) and freshly observed (new)
// IP-with-timestamp lists for a single client into a map. An entry is
// dropped if its last-seen timestamp is older than staleCutoff.
//
// Extracted as a helper so updateInboundClientIps can stay DB-oriented
// and the merge policy can be exercised by a unit test.
func mergeClientIps(old, new []IPWithTimestamp, staleCutoff int64) map[string]int64 {
ipMap := make(map[string]int64, len(old)+len(new))
for _, ipTime := range old {
if ipTime.Timestamp < staleCutoff {
continue
}
ipMap[ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
for _, ipTime := range new {
if ipTime.Timestamp < staleCutoff {
continue
}
if existingTime, ok := ipMap[ipTime.IP]; !ok || ipTime.Timestamp > existingTime {
ipMap[ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
}
return ipMap
}
// partitionLiveIps splits the merged ip map into live (seen in the
// current scan) and historical (only in the db blob, still inside the
// staleness window).
//
// only live ips count toward the per-client limit. historical ones stay
// in the db so the panel keeps showing them, but they must not take a
// protected slot. the 30min cutoff alone isn't tight enough: an ip that
// stopped connecting a few minutes ago still looks fresh to
// mergeClientIps, and since the over-limit picker sorts ascending and
// keeps the oldest, those idle entries used to win the slot while the
// ip actually connecting got classified as excess and sent to fail2ban
// every tick. see #4077 / #4091.
//
// live is sorted ascending so the "protect original, ban newcomer"
// rule still holds when several ips are really connecting at once.
func partitionLiveIps(ipMap map[string]int64, observedThisScan map[string]bool) (live, historical []IPWithTimestamp) {
live = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(observedThisScan))
historical = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(ipMap))
for ip, ts := range ipMap {
entry := IPWithTimestamp{IP: ip, Timestamp: ts}
if observedThisScan[ip] {
live = append(live, entry)
} else {
historical = append(historical, entry)
}
}
sort.Slice(live, func(i, j int) bool { return live[i].Timestamp < live[j].Timestamp })
sort.Slice(historical, func(i, j int) bool { return historical[i].Timestamp < historical[j].Timestamp })
return live, historical
}
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func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkFail2BanInstalled() bool {
cmd := "fail2ban-client"
args := []string{"-h"}
err := exec.Command(cmd, args...).Run()
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return err == nil
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkAccessLogAvailable(iplimitActive bool) bool {
accessLogPath, err := xray.GetAccessLogPath()
if err != nil {
return false
}
if accessLogPath == "none" || accessLogPath == "" {
if iplimitActive {
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logger.Warning("[LimitIP] Access log path is not set, Please configure the access log path in Xray configs.")
}
return false
}
return true
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkError(e error) {
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if e != nil {
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logger.Warning("client ip job err:", e)
}
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) getInboundClientIps(clientEmail string) (*model.InboundClientIps, error) {
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db := database.GetDB()
InboundClientIps := &model.InboundClientIps{}
err := db.Model(model.InboundClientIps{}).Where("client_email = ?", clientEmail).First(InboundClientIps).Error
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return InboundClientIps, nil
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) addInboundClientIps(clientEmail string, ipsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp) error {
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inboundClientIps := &model.InboundClientIps{}
jsonIps, err := json.Marshal(ipsWithTime)
j.checkError(err)
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inboundClientIps.ClientEmail = clientEmail
inboundClientIps.Ips = string(jsonIps)
db := database.GetDB()
tx := db.Begin()
defer func() {
if err == nil {
tx.Commit()
} else {
tx.Rollback()
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}
}()
err = tx.Save(inboundClientIps).Error
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) updateInboundClientIps(inboundClientIps *model.InboundClientIps, clientEmail string, newIpsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp) bool {
// Get the inbound configuration
inbound, err := j.getInboundByEmail(clientEmail)
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if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed to fetch inbound settings for email %s: %s", clientEmail, err)
return false
}
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if inbound.Settings == "" {
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logger.Debug("wrong data:", inbound)
return false
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}
settings := map[string][]model.Client{}
json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &settings)
clients := settings["clients"]
// Find the client's IP limit
var limitIp int
var clientFound bool
for _, client := range clients {
if client.Email == clientEmail {
limitIp = client.LimitIP
clientFound = true
break
}
}
if !clientFound || limitIp <= 0 || !inbound.Enable {
// No limit or inbound disabled, just update and return
jsonIps, _ := json.Marshal(newIpsWithTime)
inboundClientIps.Ips = string(jsonIps)
db := database.GetDB()
db.Save(inboundClientIps)
return false
}
// Parse old IPs from database
var oldIpsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp
if inboundClientIps.Ips != "" {
json.Unmarshal([]byte(inboundClientIps.Ips), &oldIpsWithTime)
}
Fix IP Limit continuous ban loop from stale DB entries (#4077) After 60abeaa flipped the excess-IP selector to "oldest wins, newest loses" (to protect the original/current connections), the per-client IP table in `inbound_client_ips.ips` never evicted IPs that stopped connecting. Their stored timestamp stayed ancient, so on every subsequent run they counted as the "oldest protected" slot(s) and whichever IP was actually using the config now was classified as "new excess" and re-banned via fail2ban. This is exactly the #4077 scenario: two IPs connect once and get recorded, the ban lifts after the configured duration, the lone legitimate IP that reconnects gets banned again, and again, and again — a permanent 3xipl.log loop with no real abuser anywhere. Fix: when merging the persisted `old` list with the freshly observed `new` log lines, drop entries whose last-seen timestamp is older than `ipStaleAfterSeconds` (30 minutes). A client that's actually still active refreshes its timestamp any time xray emits a new `accepted` line for a fresh TCP, so the cutoff is far above even idle streaming sessions; a client that's genuinely gone falls out of the table in bounded time and frees its slot. Extracted the merge into `mergeClientIps` so it can be exercised by unit tests without spinning up the full DB-backed job. Tests cover: - stale old entry is dropped (the #4077 regression) - fresh old entries are still carried forward (access-log rotation is still backed by the persisted table) - newer timestamp wins when the same IP appears in both lists - a clock-skewed old `new` entry can't resurrect a stale IP - a zero cutoff never over-evicts Closes #4077
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// Merge old and new IPs, evicting entries that haven't been
// re-observed in a while. See mergeClientIps / #4077 for why.
ipMap := mergeClientIps(oldIpsWithTime, newIpsWithTime, time.Now().Unix()-ipStaleAfterSeconds)
// only ips seen in this scan count toward the limit. see
// partitionLiveIps.
observedThisScan := make(map[string]bool, len(newIpsWithTime))
for _, ipTime := range newIpsWithTime {
observedThisScan[ipTime.IP] = true
}
liveIps, historicalIps := partitionLiveIps(ipMap, observedThisScan)
shouldCleanLog := false
j.disAllowedIps = []string{}
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// Open log file
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logIpFile, err := os.OpenFile(xray.GetIPLimitLogPath(), os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
if err != nil {
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logger.Errorf("failed to open IP limit log file: %s", err)
return false
}
defer logIpFile.Close()
log.SetOutput(logIpFile)
log.SetFlags(log.LstdFlags)
// historical db-only ips are excluded from this count on purpose.
var keptLive []IPWithTimestamp
if len(liveIps) > limitIp {
shouldCleanLog = true
// protect the oldest live ip, ban newcomers.
keptLive = liveIps[:limitIp]
bannedLive := liveIps[limitIp:]
// log format is load-bearing: x-ui.sh create_iplimit_jails builds
// filter.d/3x-ipl.conf with
// failregex = \[LIMIT_IP\]\s*Email\s*=\s*<F-USER>.+</F-USER>\s*\|\|\s*Disconnecting OLD IP\s*=\s*<ADDR>\s*\|\|\s*Timestamp\s*=\s*\d+
// don't change the wording.
for _, ipTime := range bannedLive {
j.disAllowedIps = append(j.disAllowedIps, ipTime.IP)
log.Printf("[LIMIT_IP] Email = %s || Disconnecting OLD IP = %s || Timestamp = %d", clientEmail, ipTime.IP, ipTime.Timestamp)
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}
// force xray to drop existing connections from banned ips
j.disconnectClientTemporarily(inbound, clientEmail, clients)
} else {
keptLive = liveIps
}
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// keep kept-live + historical in the blob so the panel keeps showing
// recently seen ips. banned live ips are already in the fail2ban log
// and will reappear in the next scan if they reconnect.
dbIps := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(keptLive)+len(historicalIps))
dbIps = append(dbIps, keptLive...)
dbIps = append(dbIps, historicalIps...)
jsonIps, _ := json.Marshal(dbIps)
inboundClientIps.Ips = string(jsonIps)
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db := database.GetDB()
err = db.Save(inboundClientIps).Error
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if err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to save inboundClientIps:", err)
return false
}
if len(j.disAllowedIps) > 0 {
logger.Infof("[LIMIT_IP] Client %s: Kept %d live IPs, queued %d new IPs for fail2ban", clientEmail, len(keptLive), len(j.disAllowedIps))
}
return shouldCleanLog
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}
// disconnectClientTemporarily removes and re-adds a client to force disconnect banned connections
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) disconnectClientTemporarily(inbound *model.Inbound, clientEmail string, clients []model.Client) {
var xrayAPI xray.XrayAPI
apiPort := j.resolveXrayAPIPort()
err := xrayAPI.Init(apiPort)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to init Xray API for disconnection: %v", err)
return
}
defer xrayAPI.Close()
// Find the client config
var clientConfig map[string]any
for _, client := range clients {
if client.Email == clientEmail {
// Convert client to map for API
clientBytes, _ := json.Marshal(client)
json.Unmarshal(clientBytes, &clientConfig)
break
}
}
if clientConfig == nil {
return
}
// Only perform remove/re-add for protocols supported by XrayAPI.AddUser
protocol := string(inbound.Protocol)
switch protocol {
case "vmess", "vless", "trojan", "shadowsocks":
// supported protocols, continue
default:
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Temporary disconnect is not supported for protocol %s on inbound %s", protocol, inbound.Tag)
return
}
// For Shadowsocks, ensure the required "cipher" field is present by
// reading it from the inbound settings (e.g., settings["method"]).
if string(inbound.Protocol) == "shadowsocks" {
var inboundSettings map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &inboundSettings); err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to parse inbound settings for shadowsocks cipher: %v", err)
} else {
if method, ok := inboundSettings["method"].(string); ok && method != "" {
clientConfig["cipher"] = method
}
}
}
// Remove user to disconnect all connections
err = xrayAPI.RemoveUser(inbound.Tag, clientEmail)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to remove user %s: %v", clientEmail, err)
return
}
// Wait a moment for disconnection to take effect
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Re-add user to allow new connections
err = xrayAPI.AddUser(protocol, inbound.Tag, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to re-add user %s: %v", clientEmail, err)
}
}
// resolveXrayAPIPort returns the API inbound port from running config, then template config, then default.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) resolveXrayAPIPort() int {
var configErr error
var templateErr error
if port, err := getAPIPortFromConfigPath(xray.GetConfigPath()); err == nil {
return port
} else {
configErr = err
}
db := database.GetDB()
var template model.Setting
if err := db.Where("key = ?", "xrayTemplateConfig").First(&template).Error; err == nil {
if port, parseErr := getAPIPortFromConfigData([]byte(template.Value)); parseErr == nil {
return port
} else {
templateErr = parseErr
}
} else {
templateErr = err
}
logger.Warningf(
"[LIMIT_IP] Could not determine Xray API port from config or template; falling back to default port %d (config error: %v, template error: %v)",
defaultXrayAPIPort,
configErr,
templateErr,
)
return defaultXrayAPIPort
}
func getAPIPortFromConfigPath(configPath string) (int, error) {
configData, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return getAPIPortFromConfigData(configData)
}
func getAPIPortFromConfigData(configData []byte) (int, error) {
xrayConfig := &xray.Config{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(configData, xrayConfig); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
for _, inboundConfig := range xrayConfig.InboundConfigs {
if inboundConfig.Tag == "api" && inboundConfig.Port > 0 {
return inboundConfig.Port, nil
}
}
return 0, errors.New("api inbound port not found")
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) getInboundByEmail(clientEmail string) (*model.Inbound, error) {
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db := database.GetDB()
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inbound := &model.Inbound{}
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err := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).Where("settings LIKE ?", "%"+clientEmail+"%").First(inbound).Error
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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return inbound, nil
}